JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 
I. Introduction
A N extensive literature in economics has examined the determinants of profitability, with much of the focus centering on the role of market structure. Only recently, however, have the effects of labor unions on profitability been analyzed. This is surprising since labor economists long have emphasized union influences on wages and productivity that in turn may affect profitability.' In recent studies, Freeman (1983) and Karier (1985) report a significant limiting influence of unions on price-cost margins in high concentration manufacturing industries. Using firm-level data and the market-based Tobin's q measure of profitability, Salinger (1984) also concludes that unions effectively capture monopoly profits associated with higher concentration. In contrast, Clark (1984) finds accounting rates of return on sales and capital are reduced most significantly by unions in product-lines having low market shares. These studies, however, have not examined other potentially important routes through which unions might influence profitability.2
In this paper, the returns due to firm-specific factors are viewed as especially vulnerable to union capture to the extent that the sources of these rents are not transferable across firms. That is, since contracts which license others to produce and share in the revealed proprietary advantages of rent-earning firms can be costly to monitor and enforce, firms will maintain "own" production and share rents with unionized employees when this sharing is less costly than contract monitoring and enforcement.
Section II examines the manner in which unions may affect firm profitability, and presents our model of union rent seeking. Here, we offer research and development (R & D) as an example of an intangible capital asset whose returns are vulnerable to union rent seeking. We also discuss the role of "efficient contracts" in minimizing the allocative effects of successful union rent seeking. In section III, we specify, estimate, and test hypotheses derived from our model and measure union effects on market value and R & D investment. Conclusions and implications for future research are presented in section IV.
II. Union Rent Seeking and Market Value of the Firm

A. Unions and Profitability
A traditional view of unions is that they act as monopoly providers of labor and use this power to obtain compensation above that in the nonunion sector. Supercompetitive union wages are possible when members share in any firm returns to market power or Ricardian advantages. In response to union wage gains, the firm adjusts upward along its labor demand schedule, hiring fewer and, in the long run, more able workers. Ceteris paribus, profitability for the unionized firm will unambiguously decrease since the union has increased labor costs,
B. Union Rent Seeking and Intangible Capital
The source of union wage gains is an important unresolved issue. Union rent seeking is likely to be most successful where bargaining firms enjoy above-normal returns due to market power or Ricardian advantages, since these returns can be shared even in long-run equilibrium. While it is generally believed that the profit target is larger among firms with greater market shares or in more concentrated industries, the sources of above-normal returns may relate more to firm-specific factors than to the size distribution of competitors (Hirschey, 1985) . It is therefore not surprising that studies considering the effects of market structure on the union-profitability relation produce inconclusive results (see Hirsch and Connolly, 1985) .
While the effects of market structure on union success in bargaining have received attention in the literature, the potential effects of Ricardian rents, related to firm-specific factors which lower costs or increase output quality, have been largely ignored. As in the case of durable capital (see Baldwin, 1983) , specialized production capabilities generate rents which are vulnerable to capture.4 For example, trade secrets which give rise to production advantages and above-normal returns seldom can be transferred or licensed without economic risk. Contracts can be designed to ameliorate the problem of stolen trade secrets, but the expense of contract monitoring and enforcement may provide firms with a greater incentive to accede to union wage demands to protect proprietary information. 3For example, one outcome is that settlements occur on a vertical contract curve, formed by the tangencies of the union's indifference and the firm's isoprofit curves, so that nonunion quantities of labor and capital are employed. In this case, the union decreases profits, but no static inefficiency occurs as a result of the union. 4Baldwin (1983) analyzes the case of an industry with a large sunk-cost technology whose capital replacement cycle is long relative to the union's time horizon. If its durable capital is specialized, unions will have an incentive to demand higher wages as a means of expropriating some of the returns, while capital owners may have short-run incentives to acquiesce (as opposed to, say, letting a plant stand idle during a strike). Because capital vulnerability decreases the expected return on investment, Baldwin suggests that the firm will decrease new capital formation as a means of discouraging higher future wage demands.
R & D provides an interesting example of intangible capital, the returns to which may be susceptible to union rent seeking. The extent to which a firm's returns on R&D investment are vulnerable will depend on many influences including the union's bargaining power, the nature of the firm's production process, the firm's ability to license product and process innovations, and possibly the relative time horizons of R&D returns and union members.5 Among these factors, patents and the patentability of R&D output play an important role. As is well known, much useful output of R&D programs does not lead directly to patents, while the value of patents themselves sometimes is diminished by the types of information which must be revealed in the patenting process. Many product or process innovations are never patented because of concerns over maintaining the advantages of proprietary information and the difficulty of doing so under current patent law and practice. Therefore, the extent to which R & D returns are vulnerable to union sharing will depend not only on union power, but also on the extent to which important inventions or innovations can be patented. Valuable unpatented R & D output increases firm vulnerability to union sharing in R&D returns but greater labor costs may be offset by still greater information retention advantages to proprietary production. Conversely, patent protection reduces firm vulnerability to union sharing in the returns to R & D since the market for patents allows firm-to-firm transfers of these intangible assets at maximum (nonunion) values. This assumes that union firms not only have the potential to license to nonunion or foreign firms but also that unions cannot organize quickly wherever licensed technology or rents occur.
We hypothesize that unpatented R& D investments will add less to the market value of a union firm than an otherwise similar nonunion firm. On the other hand, given an efficient market for patents, we anticipate no limiting effect of unions Comanor and Wilson (1967) have argued that intangible capital has a high discount rate because of risk, and a faster decay rate than does tangible capital since intangible capital seldom involves easily marketable assets with well-defined property rights. Firm expenditures to protect intangible capital (e.g., trade secrets) will be made so long as marginal protection costs are less than the marginal returns to protection. Whereas both union and nonunion firms bear property right enforcement costs in the face of external pressures, unionized firms must bear additional costs to protect intangible capital returns from internal capture by the union. These enforcement costs may take the form of direct payoffs or be associated with the adoption of costly implicit or explicit contract provisions which make labor's in-5A union has a limited time horizon given that neither members nor leaders generally hav0proprietary rights in the union or the firm. Thus, it is possible that the expected payoff period for some R & D investments will be longer than union members' expected remaining work life (or, of greater relevance, union members with median preferences). 
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terests incentive-compatible with those of the firm. 7 We therefore argue that the unionized firm will bear enforcement costs, EC(I), above those borne by a nonunion firm, in order to maintain its claim on rent-producing intangible capital against union pressure. Symbolically,
where f ' > 0. The firm will bear marginal enforcement costs so long as they are less than the marginal loss from rent sharing. Thus, voluntary sharing with labor, VS(I), of intangible capital returns is
where g' > 0 represents the marginal sharing cost or union " tax" on intangible capital returns. For a given level of intangible capital investment, profit maximization requires that the firm minimize the sum of enforcement and sharing costs, or
Min [EC(I) + VS(I)]. (4)
While a unionized firm must bear costs EC(I) + VS(I), a nonunion firm must bear a cost, C, to prevent unionization of the work force. The firm will resist union organizing so long as
C < EC(I) + VS(I).
( 5) That is, if the cost of union avoidance is less than the sum of enforcement and sharing costs of union rent seeking, nonunion status will be retained; otherwise, not. The market value difference between union and nonunion firms, ceteris paribus, will be
MV(F)u -MV(F)nu = C-EC(I)-VS(I) < 0 (6)
where MV(F)U and MV(F),U are market values of union and nonunion firms, respectively. This difference is a function of the level of intangible capital investment and enforcement and sharing costs, mitigated by savings on union avoidance costs. Our simple model predicts unambiguously that owing to enforcement and sharing costs, intangible capital investments add less to the market value of union than nonunion firms. While both enforcement and sharing costs lower rates of return to intangible capital, they have different effects on marginal returns (and, hence, investment propensity). When enforcement costs are low, relatively efficient arrangements between unions and firms will evolve such that firms invest in intangible capital at close to nonunion levels (i.e., both parties agree to maximize the size of the pie). In this case, unionization effectively acts as a neutral lump-sum tax on profits wherein average but not equilibrium marginal rates of return on investments are decreased. Where such arrangements are costly to establish and enforce, we expect to see a lower marginal rate of return schedule and, in response, less investment. 
where U -EV/S is the interaction of unionization and profitability; Xli is a vector of control variables including GR, DIV, and 1/S; w is an error term with zero mean and constant variance; and all other variables are as defined earlier. From section II, we expect union rent seeking will limit R & D investment intensity (i.e., d(R & D/S)/d U < 0). Lower market value effects of R & D and lower R & D investment by union firms implies real union effects and inefficient contracting between unions and firms. We also expect that firms in highly unionized industries will be less likely to channel profits into vulnerable R & D investments (b2 < 0). Inclusion of industry dummies in (10) may be particularly important given the large variability in R & D spending across industries (Scott, 1984) and our inability to measure directly R & D opportunity and appropriability variables (Levin et al., 1985). (For discussion of additional aspects of (10), see Connolly and Hirschey (1984).) B. EV/S Results
Since several general hypotheses are nested in (9), we can evaluate these competing hypotheses with standard testing procedures. Based on the all-inclusive model, we could not reject the hypotheses that (1) market share and concentration do not provide a significant source of economic profits (a 3CR = a3MS = 0; F2,332 = 1.48) and (2) the joint union "tax" on market power related profits is zero (a2i = 0 for all i; F3,332 = 1.18). The critical F values for these tests are 5.43 and 4.90, respectively, and are calculated using Leamer's (1978, p. 114) method which incorporates a sample size correction. Based on these test 10CR is not adjusted for regional market concentration or foreign trade. Following the suggestion of referees, we examined variables measuring minimum efficient scale, capital intensity, and leverage (the latter as an alternative measure of risk). None was even marginally significant, while all inferences were unaffected. "1The industry dummies, measured at the two-digit or combined two-digit level, help control for the nonrandom distribution of unionization across firms and any disequilibrium present in the cross section. In work not shown, we calculated an endogenous union density variable generated from a reducedform equation including the exogenous variables in our system plus additional labor force and industry characteristics. To calculate unanticipated patent intensity (P/S), we estimated a two-stage least squares ( In contrast with the robust results reported above, we find the valuation effects of AD/S and P/S increase with unionization. While we expected at most a weak, negative interaction effect of U with AD/S and P/S, we have no convincing explanation for a positive interaction. It should be noted, however, that the U AD/S and U P/S coefficients display considerable sensitivity to model specification and outliers in the data. Individual regressions on each union quartile provide no indication of any simple, regular relation between union density and the valuation effects of advertising and patents. We also find (in results not shown) that the large difference in R& D investment behavior is between firms in industries with very low union density and firms in the other union classes. There are only small and marginally significant differences in the union effect on R&D/S between the three largest union classes. This suggests that even moderate levels of industry unionization significantly affect investment behavior, while the impact of further increases in union density is relatively small. Alternatively, unionism may be correlated with omitted variables measuring R & D appropriability and/or opportunity. Further research on this topic would be helpful.
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D. Other Results
We find little evidence that unions capture rents associated with other dimensions of output market structure. Coefficients on U-CR, U-MS, and U-DOM are negative but statistically insignificant in most cases and there is some evidence of sensitivity to model specification (these issues are considered in detail in Hirsch and Connolly (1985) ). Because of the fragility of these results and the lack of corroborative labor market evidence (see Hirsch and Connolly), we are uncomfortable with the union-market structure conclusions reached by Freeman, Karier, and Salinger. We believe the returns to R & D may provide a more important source for union rent seeking than profits related to output market concentration or market share distribution.
Finally, based on column (4) of table 2, the overall estimated union effect on profits (d(EV/S)/dU) is -0.087. This implies that a firm in an industry with, say, 0.5 union density would have an EV/S approximately 0.026 lower than an otherwise similar firm with 0.2 union density (EV/S= 0.067).
IV. Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided theory and evidence concerning union rent seeking and its effects on firm market value and intangible capital investment. Consistent with our hypothesis that union rent seeking can take the form of a distortionary tax on the returns to long-lived investments, we find that intangible R & D investments add relatively less to the market value of firms in more unionized industries. Firms in highly unionized industries respond by investing less intensively in R & D. Despite the apparent clarity of our results, two caveats bear repeating. First, the key union variable is measured for the firm's principal three-digit industry, and not at the firm level. Second, the union variable may in part capture the effects of omitted variables, in particular, those measuring R &D appropriability and opportunity. Further research with data sets containing better measures of unionism and appropriability/opportunity variables is clearly needed.
While this paper focuses on the profit and R & D investment effects of unions, our analysis can and should be extended. If our hypotheses concerning union rent seeking and R & D investment are correct, one should observe differences in R & D strategies between union and nonunion firms. Differences should be observed not only in R & D intensity, but also in firms' "make" versus "buy" decisions, their mix between short-and long-run investments, and their propensity to pursue easily marketable investment paths.
The broader economic implications of union rent seeking may be ambiguous if, in contrast to our results, market power provides the major source for union rents. However, our finding that 14The endogenous variables are EV/S, U, U-EV/S, CR, MS, and AD/S. We use Kelejian's 2SLS estimation technique since (10) is nonlinear in its variables (U * EV/S) but linear in the parameters. The instruments include the exogenous variables in (9) and (10) and additional industry-and firm-level variables.
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unionism decreases both the returns to and levels of R & D investment clearly appears to have negative implications for economic efficiency and longrun growth. There is, in fact, evidence suggesting that residual total factor productivity growth has been lower in highly unionized industries (for a summary, see Hirsch and Addison, 1986, ch. 7). Given the importance of these and related issues, we believe there exists much potential for future research on the specific routes through which union rent seeking affects firms' investment behavior and subsequent economic performance. 
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